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The protection of critical irifrastructures and the choices made in terms of priorities and cost, all impact upon 
the planning, precautions and security aspects of protecting these important systems. Often the when choices 
made is difficult to assess at the time the decision is taken and it is only after an incident that the truth of the 
choices made become fit!ly evident. The paper focllses on two recent examples of Australian Critical 
Infrastructure protection and the issues that related to those examples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The provision and delivery of many of the services that modern society enjoys are the result of ubiquitous 
critical infrastructure systems that permeate many sectors of the Australian community. Moreover, the 
integration of technological enhancements and networking interconnections between critical infrastructure 
systems has heightened system availability and resilience, including the efficient delivery of services to 
consumers throughout Australia. However, the reliance on these services and their supporting systems is 
evermore critical: as the removal, temporary loss, degradation or destruction of a single or multiple systems 
would have a detrimental impact across many sectors of Australian society, With this increasing integration and 
societal dependence on critical infrastructure systems, their security, availability and protection becomes 
increasingly significant. 
The broader Australian community has an expectation that services such as power and water will be available 
when desired and that it will be provided as expected in a safe manner. These services and others are provided 
by various infrastructure systems dedicated to producing and or providing these services seamlessly to all 
consumers within our modern society. Therefore, by community expectation and necessity, the protection of 
these critical infrastructure systems is an imperative to governments, infrastructure owners and consumers. 
The nature of these critical infi'astructure systems and their systematic interconnection display attributes of 
highly structured, complex interconnected networks that characterise the issues of dependency and 
interdependency relationships, which by necessity exist between infi'astructures to facilitate the supply of 
services. This is particularly prevalent when considering the energy sector, where for instance the continuity of 
the supply of electricity is crucial to many other sectors of Australia's critical infrastructure for their ongoing 
provision of services to the community at large (Scott, 2005). 
In the Australian context some common examples of critical infrastructure systems and services to the 
community, rely on electricity; water; gas and fuel; health services; telecommunications, and banking and 
financial services to name a few (AGD 2008). Furthermore, other services that are regarded as critical 
infrastructures in other national contexts may include: air transportation; ground transportation (for example, 
interstate trucking, railroads, highways, bridges); telephone; cellular telephone; internet; sewers; food 
distribution and social events (for example, shopping, sports, entertainment) (Smith 2002). However, critical 
infrastructures are vulnerable and can be damaged, destroyed or disrupted by breakdowns, negligence, natural 
disasters, accidents, cyber incidents, illegal criminal activity and malicious damage, So it is for these and other 
reasons that drives the need to protect the continuity of supply against such hazards and threats. It is the aim of 
government policy and also that of infi'astructure owners and operators, to ensure continued supply through 
identifying and implementing improved security, protective safeguards and analysis in response to the identified 
threats, vulnerabilities and weaknesses posed (Scott, 2005; Bentley, 2006). 
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Therefore, protecting critical infrastructure systems fi'om damage and maintaining system functionality, 
resilience and delivery of the services to the community, requires ethical choices to be made by governments, 
owners and emergency services, particularly during times of natural disaster. 
This paper investigates the choices that arise with regard to managing threats to critical inti'astructure systems 
during times of disaster or when the critical infrastructure system itself becomes the risk. 
BACKGROUND 
In terms of defining critical infrastructure, the specific Australian determination is as follows (TISN 2004, p.3): 
"Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would 
significantly impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia's ability to conduct 
national defence and ensure national security." 
The ditfusion of critical infrastructures permeates across many sectors of the Australian community and 
economy including banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply, 
communications and even key government services and national icons. Some elements are not strictly physical 
infrastructure and may be 'viliual' in terms of internet-based electronic supply chains for example, or other 
networks that suppOli the delivery of all important products, information or services (TISN 2003, 
2004).Generally, these modern critical infrastructure systems exist securely and seamlessly within our 
environment and provide many of the services and resources that Australians utilise on an everyday basis; be it 
at home, work or leisure. 
Security and the Environment 
Likewise environmental change and its affect can have an impact on human security in a number of ways. If 
considered from an anthropogenic perspective, it can cause contlict and it can degrade the resources available to 
human societies (for example, by decreasing biodiversity, by clearing such items as mangrove swamps and 
forests, by decreasing cropland). Furthermore, such impacts upon the environment can disrupt the very 
economic base of societies. So to summarise the impact of the natural environment on security, it can be stated 
that: 
.. The natural environmental can provide a source of conflict over natural resources and services by their 
decrease and unequal distribution (Klare, 2001; Renner; 2002); 
.. Environmental change can affect human security by producing situations that adversely affect human 
health and well-being for example, drought, food shortages, bio-security threats, chemical 
contamination and availability of usable land. Also it can directly affect society'S infrastructure for 
example, climate change can cause an increase in bushfires which in themselves can threaten water 
supplies (by contamination) and power supply (by destruction of power lines and generation facilities); 
.. Human military and industrial activity can seriously affect environmental health and therefore human 
security. 
However, this is taking a very human-centred approach where the object to be 'secured' is the human and 
associated systems. A more eco-centric viewpoint would be concerned with the security of regional or global 
eco-systems. Even the concept of sustainability - both 'weak' and 'strong' which determine whether natural and 
human capital are considered complements rather than substitutes are considered from a human perspective. In a 
sense, it is difficult not to do this. However, it is possible to attempt to draw the boundary around a security 
problem to actively include them on an equal footing with infrastructure systems. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
The implementation of protective measures aimed at securing critical infrastructure systems requires a 
considered approach, as there are many variables involved in establishing and maintaining a balance between 
security and functionality of service delivery and system availability. A key part of the greater national 
infrastructure security picture is the continued availability of critical infrastructure systems that provide and 
deliver services to the community, to which it has become increasingly reliant. 
The underlying premise is that through their pervasiveness nature, these systems and services have become 
crucial to an improved standard of living for the community generally. Therefore, it is the convenience and 
availability of these critical infi'astructure system services, together with the community's expectations, which 
leads to potential social issues when the security of these systems is threatened, fails or experiences a reduced 
level of service and availability. Depending upon the amount of time, how and which critical infrastructure 
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system or multiple systems thereof are affected, will invariably determine community reaction, incident 
management and contingency responses that will in turn influence the likely response and recovery actions 
instigated at governmental, business, personal and wider economic levels. 
The perception is that critical infrastructure systems and the services they deliver remain largely in the 
background, seamlessly providing the services that support the standard of living enjoyed by most highly 
industrialised societies, with their contribution largely going unnoticed until an incident occurs. 
THE 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRE - BACKGROUND 
The following case studies highlight the issues that the Victorian Bushfires created in regards to Critical 
Infi'astructure Protection. 
The 7th of February, 2009 was a day of unprecedented tragedy in the state of Victoria, Australia. One hundred 
and seventy-three people died in one of the worst bushfires in Australian history. About 430,000 hectares of 
land were burnt, as well as 2000 properties and 61 businesses, and the loss of one hundred and seventy-three 
lives (Teague et aI, 2009). One of the issues that has not been discussed about the tragic event has been the 
security implications and in particular the security repercussions in terms of protecting Critical Infrastructure 
and when the Critical Infi'astructure becomes at risk. 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CASE STUDY 1 : WATER 
The following Case Study: Victorian bushfires and its environmental security impact, discusses the impact of a 
natural threat impact a critical infi'astructure (Hutchinson & Warren 2009). 
Victoria is one of the smaller states in mainland Australia with a population of 5.17 million (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2008), and its capital city Melbourne has a population of 3.19 million (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2009). This highlights that in the state of Victoria, the majority of the population lives within a single 
city. This has implications for a number of key services that relate to Melbourne, one of the most impoliant 
issues being the provision of water. 
The majority of Melbourne's water comes fi'om within 160,000 hectares of uninhabited forested catchments 
north east of Melbourne, Victoria (Melbourne Water 2009a).The impact of the Victorian bushfire was that 
around 30% of Melbourne's catchments were damaged by fire. This was mostly centred on the O'Shannassy and 
Maroondah catchments (Melbourne Water2009b). A detailed analysis of the damage is shown in Table I. 
Catchment Fire AI'ea bUl'Ilt Share of total reservoir inflow 
affected estimate 
Reservoirs with 
catchment 
Thomson No None 36% 
Upper Yarra Yes About 2% burnt 19% 
Maroondah Yes About 75% burnt 12% 
O'Shannassy Yes About 93% burnt 12% 
Yan Yean No None 2% (not in supply) 
Tarago Yes About 50% burnt Nil (not used for Melbourne's water supply) 
Table 1: Catchment Impact Table (Melbourne Water 2009b) 
During the actual bushfire, a number of key actions were taken and issues raised, regarding water supplies, these 
included (Roberts 2009): 
It The transfer of ten billion litres of water in pipes fi'om the Upper Yarra dam to smaller dams, this was 
to safeguard the existing water supply; 
.. The major concern that the run-of ash into reservoirs would contaminate Melbourne's water supplies. If 
reservoirs were contaminated, it would be contaminated for three months and impact 24% of 
Melbourne's drinking water. 
In reality, the impact of damages caused by bushfire upon catchments areas was not as great as first feared, the 
actual damage related to (Melbourne Water 2009c) was: 
.. Damage to water supply infrastructure was limited to minor things such as weir gates; 
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• The Maroondah aqueduct system escaped major damage but had been experiencing blockages in places 
by fallen trees and landslides; 
• Some movement of soil following the rains since the fires, particularly in the Wallaby Creek area. This 
is usual with high intensity fires; 
• Wallaby Creek sustained considerable damage in burned area and infi'astructure; 
• A number of buildings have been lost, including the historic Wallaby Creek Quarters complex. 
The Victorian bushfires had the potential to damage the water supply of a major global city. Thankfully, the 
impact was not as severe as first thought. From a critical intl'astructure protection perspective, it raises an 
interesting question about how can the water supplies be protected against such an occurrence. The issue is that 
reservoirs can only be built in areas of high rainfall; alternative solutions such as building pipelines to transfer 
water across the state can be very expensive, and they would not be immune to fire damage and could cause an 
unacceptable environmental impact. Perhaps the announcement of the building of a new desalination plant in the 
State of Victoria, that will provide 150 billion litres of water a year, could be a the solution tl'om a security 
perspective (Brumby, 2009). 
The summary of issues in relation to this case study was the magnitude of consequences. The extent of the 
Victorian bushfires was considerable. They created a major risk to Melbourne's water supply which could 
impact all of Melbourne's population. 
Due to the fact the fire spread very quickly, decisions had to be made regarding the protection of people, 
property and critical infrastructure. 
The fire had the potential to impact the majority of the population in the state of Victoria and decisions has to 
made not just to protect the local population but also larger populations in case the tire spread. 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CASE STUDY 2: POWER 
The second case study is an example of where the critical infrastructure rather than becoming an asset to be 
protected, it became a major risk and in this case actually caused fires and loss of property and life. The 
following section is based upon an assessment of the Victorian Royal Bushfire Commission (2010a, 2010b, and 
2010c). 
The age and maintenance of the Victorian power infi'astructure systems became a major during the Royal 
Commission. During the bushfires on the February 2009, five of the eleven major fires that began that day were 
caused by failed electricity assets; among the fires was that at Kilmore East, as a result of which 119 people 
died, this tire was caused by electrical arcing after a conductor (which was probably 43 years old) on the 
Pentadeen Spur line broke. 
Evidence put to the Royal Commission suggests that the age of electricity distribution assets contributed to three 
fires on 7 February 2009, these were: 
the Kilmore East fire-conductor failure caused by fatigue on a SWER (Single wire earth return) 
line13; 
the Coleraine fire-fatigue and corrosion leading to a broken tie wire and as a consequence a 
conductor starting a fire on a SWER linel4; 
the Horsham fire-fallen conductor caused by failed pole cap on a SWER linel5. 
The SWER (Single wire earth return) power infi'astructure system is old, having been introduced by the State 
Electricity Commission of Victoria in the early 1950s to provide a means of electricity distribution to rural areas 
with low population densities and where small electrical loads need to be widely dispersed. The system could be 
rolled out relatively cheaply because of its simple design, which consists of a single lightweight, high-tensile 
conductor mounted on poles. Electricity travels to the customer along the single wire, the current returning 
through the earth rather than through a second wire. 
The SWER design's simplicity offered some bushfire mitigation features because the single line could not clash 
with other lines and there were fewer poles and less associated infrastructure that could fail. The SWER design 
limits a SWER line's maximum current, though, and thus the number of customers the line can service; on the 
SP AusNet network an average SWER line serves just 45 customers. SP AusNet recognises that the SWER 
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network is reaching thermal capacity and that some SWER lines are already overloaded. This raises questions 
about the SWER system's capacity to meet present and future demand and maintain supply quality. 
Against the background of aging Victorian power infi'astructure, the Royal Commission, identified a number of 
key issues with the systems, which are: 
Aging conductors - a key report of SP AusNet's conductor study noted that the great majority of 
conductor failures on the organisation's network involved high-voltage conductors and that this 
represented a 'considerable risk to the business from a public safety and bushfire perspective'. The 
report said, 'In the absence of planned conductor replacement programs, failure rates may begin to 
increase at an exponential rate due to the increasing proportion of [the] conductor fleet 
approaching current failure age ranges'; 
Insulator failure - Insulator failure can result in pole fires, cross-arm fires, conductor drops, 
conductor clashing, and conductor contact with the ground. Such incidents constitute bushfire 
risks; 
Aging assets - There is a substantial peak in the age of assets, indicated by the example of wood 
poles. In 2004 there are 37,000 wood poles 50 years and older, however this will increase to 
approximately 62,000 by 2010 based on average replacement of 1,500 wood poles per year; 
Impact of external elements - studies examined the circumstances of the tie-wire failure that led to 
the Coleraine fire on 7 February. The study found that the typical life span for zinc galvanising on 
tie wires of that kind is about 40 years and that the Coleraine tie wire was probably more than 40 
years old. The study noted the galvanising on that tie wire had been consumed by external 
elements, greatly increasing the corrosion rate and leading to pitting and the initiation of fatigue 
cracks on the tie wire. 
The key recommendations from the Royal Commission in relation to power infrastructure were: 
The progressive replacement of all SWER (single-wire earth return) power lines in Victoria with 
aerial bundled cable, underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced 
bushfire risk. The replacement program should be completed in the areas of highest bushfire risk 
within 10 years and should continue in areas of lower bushfire risk as the lines reach the end of 
their engineering lives 
The progressive replacement of all 22-kilovolt distribution feeders with aerial bundled cable, 
underground cabling or other technology that delivers greatly reduced bushfire risk as the feeders 
reach the end of their engineering lives. Priority should be given to distribution feeders in the areas 
of highest bushfire risk. 
The Victorian state government premier response to the power-line replacement recommendations was "it 
literally out of this world, it's $20b plus, and secondly, you could do all of that and you still get fires that are 
caused by machinery ... lightning ... arson." The Victorian state Government will set up a $2m taskforce, to 
work with industry to identify high priority areas for upgrading powerlines (ABC, 2010). 
The summary of issues in relation to this case study again was the magnitude of consequences. The magnitude 
of the Victorian bushfires was considerable. A major difference in this case study was that in many cases the 
critical infrastructure caused the fires and by doing so destroyed parts of itself. The initial impact of the failure 
was localised in the vicinity of the fire, but due to environmental conditions these tires quickly spread. There 
was not a major risk to Melbourne's power supply immediately, even though a later fire in Gippsland did put 
Melbourne's power supply at risk by threatening the power cables from the La Trobe power station complex. 
Due to the fact the fire spread very quickly, decisions had to be made regarding the protection of people, 
propeliy and critical infrastructure. At the time there was no realisation that the power infrastructure had caused 
the fires. 
The loss of the power service impacted localised communities and in many cases impacted their ability to fight 
the fires or communicate the situation or developing situation. 
CONCLUSION 
Security implications are inherent in all critical infrastructure related protection decisions. Decision makers 
should be aware of the stance and assumptions they are making in regard to these issues and be aware of the 
implications of the stand point taken. The issue is that protection of critical infrastructure can easily be 
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identified, but when the critical infrastructure becomes the risk, especially with ageing critical infrastructure, 
this could pose new critical infrastructure protection issues. 
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